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SOME ASPECTS OF THE USE OF CORRECTIVE
TAXES FOR CONTROLLING AIR
POLLUTION EMISSIONS*
COLIN WRIGHTt

The rising level of air pollution is one of our most pressing social
problems. In this article I consider some of the economic aspects of
air pollution control as they pertain to the drafting of pollution
abatement ordinances.' In addition, since detailed benefit-cost studies
will not be forthcoming in this area in the near future, my results are
suggestive of certain types of empirical investigations that could be
implemented when data are limited.
Initially I investigate alternative schemes for controlling pollution emissions within the framework of simple models, assuming that
the magnitudes of the relevant variables are known. This is not an
exercise of theoretical interest only for certain principles are established that should not be overlooked when pollution ordinances
are drafted. After this analysis I introduce certain constraints into
the various models and investigate the consequences of doing so.
Throughout this article I assume that the community in question, or
the region defined appropriately as an air shed, has established an
air pollution control board (APCD) and bestowed upon it the necessary authority to implement any program it deems desirable and/or
feasible. I further suppose that the APCD desires to obtain any pollution abatement in the most efficient manner given those constraints
existing within the community, whether real or imagined. Finally, I
assume the economy, with the exception of those sectors affected by
air pollution, is organized efficiently.

The air or atmosphere may be thought of as an asset or factor of
production used in two separate and conflicting activities: It supports
life and property and functions as a waste disposal for polluting
firms. An air pollution problem will most likely exist when property
rights to the atmosphere have not been legally established, for then
polluting firms will effectively appropriate the atmosphere by emitting pollutants without restraint. Such an appropriation bestows
benefits upon the polluter and damages upon the pollutee.
* This article was supported by a grant from Resources for the Future, Inc.
t Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
1. Much of what I establish in this paper is equally applicable to water pollution or
any other form of pollution.
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The nature of the polluter's benefits are in the form of cost savings from using the atmosphere as a factor of production (a waste
disposal) at a zero price. Alternatively, this saving results from the
absence of any requirement to install pollution abatement equipment.
The damages imposed upon the pollutee may take a variety of forms,
such as increased cleaning and medical costs and increased transportation costs brought about by individuals attempting to escape the
polluted air.
Throughout this paper I shall assume that the increment to total
cost saving (marginal cost saving) as emissions increase to be positive but diminishing and the increment to total damages (marginal
damages) to be positive but increasing. I illustrate these relationships in Figure 1 where an additional step to simplify the subsequent
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Figure 1

analysis has been made by assuming both functions to be linear.
The ordinate in Figure 1 measures both marginal damages
(MD) and cost saving (MCS) and has the dimension of dollars
per quantity of pollutant emitted. Along the abscissa is measured the
emission rate in quantity of pollutants per unit time. The product of
those variables on the ordinate and that on the abscissa, which may
be represented by a subtended rectangle or triangle under the respective curves, has the dimension of dollars per unit time. The other
curves appearing in Figure 1 will be defined in later sections.
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The assumptions underlying Figure 1 permit the marginal damage
and marginal cost saving functions to be expressed as:
(1)

MD=aP

a>0

(2)

MCS=B+bP

B>0, b<0

where P denotes the pollution emission rate. In the absence of regulation the firm will emit pollutants at the rate pm where P- satisfies
the condition that
(3)

MCS = B + bPm = 0.

That is, the unrestrained emission rate is that rate where the mar2
ginal cost saving is zero.
The optimal pollution emission rate is that rate at which the marginal cost saving from being able to pollute is equal to the marginal
damage of doing so. This emission rate is denoted as PO in Figure 1.
Though situations may exist for which pollution emissions should be
allowed to remain at the unregulated level (P-) or reduced to a
zero level they will not be investigated and I shall instead assume
throughout this article that the optimal emission rate is positive.3
The method of pollution abatement chosen by the community will
depend upon how property rights to the atmosphere are defined. Regardless of how the community assigns property rights, however, the
analysis in this article can be conceptualized in terms of the exchange
of factor services between those who have been assigned property
rights and those who have not. If pollutees have been assigned property rights to the factor, then, reading the curves in Figure 1 from
left to right, the cost-saving function may, somewhat loosely, be interpreted as the polluter's demand curve for the right to use the atmosphere as a waste disposal, and the damage function may be interpreted as the supply or marginal cost curve for these services.
Conversely, if the diagram is read from right to left, the damage
function may be interpreted as the demand curve for pollution abatement and the cost-saving function as the marginal cost of supplying
abatement services.
Following the practice already established in the economics literature on externalities of assuming that the damage and cost-saving
2. See Turvey, On Divergences Between Social and Private Cost, Economica (Aug.,
1963) 309-13 and the sources cited therein.
3. It is unfortunately the case that many activists and popular writers concerned
with air pollution control have called for the complete elimination of pollution. An examination of those sources cited in the preceding footnote should quickly establish that
such a procedure is in general not the best policy.
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functions are invariant to the definition of property rights, the total
damages and cost saving associated with the emission rate of pm may
be designated as the areas under the damage and cost-saving functions respectively. 4 Total damages and total benefits for the emission
rate Pm may then be expressed as the triangles OFPm and OBP m respectively. These areas, as mentioned previously, have the dimension
of dollars per unit time.
The gross benefits of any pollution abatement is simply the reduction in pollution damages and may be measured as the appropriate
area under the marginal damage function. The cost of abatement is
the area under the marginal cost-saving function. The net benefit,
gross benefit minus the cost of abatement and the maximand of economic theory, is at a maximum at the emission rate Po. For such an
emission rate the gross benefit is the area POEFPm, the cost of abatement is PoEPm, and the net benefit is EFPm . At no other emission
rate will the net benefit be greater than at PO, a characteristic ensuring its optimality.
The optimal emission rate can be expressed analytically as

B

pO0

(4)

(a-b)
which is the solution to setting equation (1) equal to equation (2)
and solving for P.' For a community consisting of several polluters
the optimal emission for each firm will, in general, be different. Several factors, such as location of the firm and type of pollutant, may
account for these differences and are reflected in the model of this
section by different values for the a's, b's, and B's. The optimal rate
of emission for the nth firm can be expressed as
P0
B.
" P (ab.)"

(5)

4. Turvey, sutra note 2.
5. An alternative formulation is to express a welfare function as
P

(i)

W(P) =

I (MD - MCS)dP.

P.

A maximum welfare position is one which satisfies the condition
(ii)

8W(P) = MD -MCS

aP

=

.

Substituting for MD and MCS from (i) and (ii) we obtain
(iii)

aP -

B + bP =

0

Solving for P and designating it as P0 we obtain
(iv)

po =-

B

(a-b)
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Once the optimal emission rate has been achieved, an optimal level
of pollution will exist in the community. After pollutants are emitted
from their source they are dispersed in a manner determined by meteorological conditions, the configuration of the surrounding terrain,
and the pollutants themselves, such that a given emission will affect
various people in different locations and at different intensities. If
monitoring stations were established both at the source of pollution
and at various points throughout the city, differences in pollution
levels would be observed. More individuals and their property would
be affected the more widely the pollutants were dispersed and would
be affected differently the more variation in pollution concentrations
resulted from the diffusion of a given emission.
Because pollutants are dispersed, and in general are dispersed unevenly, the usefulness of defining an optimal level of pollution for a
given community is of questionable value. What is more appropriate
is to define optimal emission rates. If emissions are optimal, then the
resulting pattern of pollution levels, even though different throughout the community, will also be optimal. The optimal level of pollution for a community is therefore most properly defined as a schedule
rather than a specific level.
An implication of the preceding is that the appropriate variables
to investigate at the community level are emissions and not some
measure of community wide pollution, though community pollution
levels, as determined, for example, by health factors, may be guides
to desired emissions.' Pollutants differ in their effect, in their diffusion, and in the costs of their abatement; and these differences should
be taken into account when abatement policies are adopted. Looking
at sources of pollution does account for all these differences while
looking at pollution on the community level does not.
Several methods for obtaining the optimum emission rate have
been proposed by economists: (a) bargaining between polluters and
pollutees; (b) the imposition of taxes (effluent fees) upon a firm's
use of those factors causing air pollution; (c) subsidizing the use of
those factors which contribute to the reduction of air pollution;
(d) payments to a firm for withholding the use of those factors
6. A common practice in the drafting of city ordinances is to legislate that the quantity of certain pollutants, most commonly sulfur dioxide, should not be above certain
levels for a given number of hours a day at predetermined monitoring stations throughout the city. These levels are often determined from evidence obtained in medical experiments on the effects of certain pollutants to human beings. See City Council of New
York, Special Committee to Investigate Air Pollution, Blueprint for Cleaner Air
(1965). In principle, and especially in view of the pessimism I have on the availability
of the type of data needed for more detailed empirical studies, this method could be
used to control emissions, with due consideration to some of the problems discussed in
this paper, to within tolerable degrees of efficiency.
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which contribute to air pollution; (e) the imposition of limits upon
the amount of air pollution a firm can emit (emission standards) ;
and (f) requirements for the firm to use certain factors of production (input standards). With the exception of emission and input
standards, it has been shown by various economists that all of these
devices are capable of obtaining an optimal rate of pollution emission. It is also evident that if P0 was known for each firm, emission
and input standards could, in principle, effect an optimum if implemented correctly.
The choice among these alternative methods of pollution abatement must, at this stage of the analysis, rest upon grounds other than
their inability to effect an optimal emission rate. One obvious consideration is that of the legal framework existing within the community
for this would determine whether taxes or subsidies were to be used.
Since it has been shown in the economics literature that the analysis
of taxes, subsidies, and payments is symmetric, once property rights
have been defined and all the relevant information obtained, a more
fundamental consideration is the demands alternative abatement
programs place upon the APCD's source of information.
Because the analysis of taxes, subsidies, and payments are symmetrical the demands placed upon the authorities' information are
the same. For this reason, I shall assume that the legal framework
makes the polluters liable and from among those control instruments
that have direct financial inducements or penalties consider only the
imposition of taxes. Throughout the remainder of this article, therefore, I shall compare only the imposition of taxes, the establishing of
emission and input standards, and the possibiliites of bargaining.
II
The minimum demand placed upon the APCD's source of information occurs when the polluter and pollutees are able and willing to
bargain. For a single polluter and pollutee the authority need only
establish the legal rights of the two individuals and provide an atmosphere conducive to bargaining. For circumstances where either the
polluters or pollutees are small groups rather than single entities
bargaining may still be feasible if the APCD provides services similar to those of a labor arbitrator. The authority then performs the
function of enabling the polluters and pollutees to organize and approach each other as a single group.' For large groups the bargaining process will break down unless such cases can be visualized as a
7. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-44
(Oct., 1960).
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political process wherein the pollutees are viewed as members of the
community who bargain, through their elective officials, with the
polluters.
The imposition of ad valorem taxes, a constant percentage per
unit, places greater demands upon the authorities' source of information than does bargaining though not as great as some have suggested. It has been suggested that in order to establish optimal effluent fees knowledge of both the damage and cost-saving functions
is required. Though this is true for the community as a whole, that
is, the authority, the polluters, and the pollutees, it is incorrect in the
sense that the APCD needs all of this information in order to impose the optimal fee. The information the authority requires to implement the optimal ad valorem tax schedule is the marginal damage
function.
In Figure 1 the dotted line BP0 represents the net marginal costsaving function or [MCS-MD]. When the polluter is confronted
with a tax schedule equal to the schedule of damages his activities
impose upon others, the profit maximizing solution when the tax
exists will be the optimal emission rate P0 .
In the absence of possibilities for bargaining, ad valorem taxes
place the least demands upon the APCD's information. It should not
be inferred, however, that this is also the case for unit taxes, a constant dollar amount per unit of pollutant. Denoting the unit tax as
T, the net of tax benefit function becomes
(6)

MCS'-

B +bP'-T= 0

where P' is the emission rate that makes the marginal net cost-saving
function zero. The optimal unit tax, To, is that which equates P' with
PO which implies that
(7)

To =

aB
(a

-

b)

Equation (7) indicates that both the damage and benefit functions
are required in order to establish the optimal unit tax, since T O is defined by the values of B and b in addition to a.
The information requirements for establishing optimum effluent
standards are identical to those required for optimal unit taxes. In
each case the optimal emission must be known, which in turn requires
knowledge of both the damage and benefit functions. Input standards
require more information than the preceding methods. Not only is
the optimal emission required, but also that combination of inputs
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that effect this emission in the most efficient manner is required.
The optimum ad valorem tax is
(8)

t=aP

following the convention of using lower case symbos for ad valorem
taxes and upper case for unit taxes. In most of what follows I shall
consider only the case of unit pollution taxes. This is done for convenience only, but this procedure in no way limits the generality of
the analysis for the ad valorem equivalent to a per unit tax can always be found.
III

Since I have assumed that the economy, with the exception of
those sectors affected by air pollution, is organized efficiently, the
gains in welfare by moving the economy from a position of unregulated pollution emissions to a position of regulated pollution are directly related to the reduction in the pollution emission rate. Furthermore, since the emission rate is determined by the magnitude of the
abatement policy instrument, in the current case the unit tax; the
gains in welfare can be related to the magnitude of the tax." The
maximum gain in welfare, or the highest level of welfare attainable,
is when the tax rate is To, a position we shall note as W(TO). For
any unit tax unequal to T O there will result a welfare loss in the sense
that further gains in welfare can be obtained by imposing a smaller
or larger tax.
The assumed goal of the APCD can then be viewed as minimizing
the loss associated with imposing unit taxes or alternative policy instruments. If the loss function associated with imposing a non-optimal tax can be approximated by a quadratic function, then for T
unequal to T O there is a loss of welfare the size of which varies more
than proportionately with the size of the difference (T - To) and
8. We may express the MD curve as j(P) and the MCS curve as (p(P). Since the
amount of pollution is a function of the tax rate we may rewrite the MD and MCS
functions as J(T) and q((T). A welfare function may then be expressed as
T
fJ [§(T) - q)(T)]dT
0
To maximize welfare with respect to the choice of the tax rate we set the derivative of
W(T) equal to zero and solve for T. Doing so we obtain
(i) a T) = (T ) - c (T )
(i)

W(T)

= 0

@T
which is similar to those conditions derived in footnote 3 and implies T O maximum welfare position may then be noted as W(TO).

aB
(a-b)

The
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depends only upon the absolute value of this difference. This implies
that tax rates larger than T Oby a given proportion result in the same
welfare loss as rates smaller than T o by the same proportion.'
An additional property of the quadratic loss function is that the
loss due to a decision error, that is choosing the wrong tax rate, is
larger when the total curvature of the damage and benefit functions
is large. That is, for a given non-optimal tax the welfare loss is
higher the larger is the sum (a + b) in equations ( 1) and (2). This
would imply, as would perhaps normally be expected anyway, that
more care should be given in choosing the magnitude of the control
instruments imposed upon those firms who create significant damages
and/or whose abatement costs are considerable. Given (a + b), the
loss varies with the square of the decision error, (T - TO") 2, and is
therefore quite small for small errors but substantially large for
large errors. It follows from this that a decision error which is of
the first order of smalls results in a loss of the second order of
smalls. Interpreted differently, these relationships indicate that there
exists sharply decreasing returns, in the sense of welfare gains, to
adjusting a tax rate already "close" to the optimum towards the
optimum.
If the quadratic function is a fair approximation, then the relevant loss function may be expressed as
L(0)=O

L = L(IT-ThI)

(9)

indicating that the welfare loss is a function of the absolute difference between T and TO. It is most likely the case, however, that the
damage function is not linear and, in fact, rises quite sharply for increasing pollution levels. In such cases the quadratic representation
does not hold, and non-optimal tax rates are no longer symmetric in
their effect. The loss function is now most appropriately expressed as
a. L, = L, (IT - T°l)

for T >-T O

b. L 2 =kLi (IT-TI)

forT--5T

(10)

o

k>0

indicating that the loss from imposing too small a tax is greater, by
a factor of k, than imposing too large a tax.
9. We may express the assumed quadratic function as
(i)

2
W(T) = % + a 1T +Y'o 2 T

or, alternatively, as
22

W (T)

= (aO

) +

.

%- 2 (T - TO)2
2a2
For 0 2 < o it follows that W (T) takes its highest value for T -- V

(ii)

.
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One implication of these relationships is that when a state of con-

siderable ignorance exists along with a commitment to a given policy
instrument, the expected value of the welfare loss of imposing a nonoptimal tax is lower if a larger rather than a smaller tax is imposed !
This in turn gives considerable incentive to imposing any abatement
instrument quite stringently.
As indicated previously, all of the preceding applies with equal
force to control instruments other than taxes that are imposed at
non-optimal levels. It should also be emphasized that the losses under consideration are those resulting from the imposition of nonoptimal controls imposed efficiently.
IV
In this section I assume that the community includes several polluters each having different optimal emission rates. This requires
that the magnitude of the control instrument chosen by the APCD
differ among firms. If the control instrument is the imposition of unit
taxes, for example, the assumption of several polluters implies that
different taxes be imposed upon each firm. I shall suppose, however,
that constraints exist within the community that do not allow such
detail in the control instrument and therefore turn to second best
solutions, the nature of which is to find that program among those
that are available that minimizes the welfare loss associated with
implementing programs other than the optimum one.'
Initially I investigate the problem of a community committed to
the unit tax form of control but constrained to impose the same tax
upon all firms. This appears to be a realistic situation confronting
control authorities when, for example, those polluters who cause the
most damage and would most likely have the largest tax imposed
upon them have sufficient political power, either singly or in concert,
to require that all firms be taxed equally. Though such political
power is assumed to exist, it is assumed to be insufficient to enable
the polluters to do away with effluent fees entirely. Furthermore, I
assume that the control authority may choose any tax rate, the constraint being that he must use only one. The single tax may also be
required because members of the APCD have a concept of equity
that requires each firm to be confronted with identical tax rates I
Consider two simple cases which can be illustrated geometrically
and which provide a basis for illustrating the principles involved in
choosing a single tax. Suppose that the community consists of two
10. See R. G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 21 Review of Economic Studies 11-32 (1956-57).
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polluters having identical cost saving functions but different damage
functions. In the absence of constraints the authority would impose
the optimal taxes T o and T- where the subscripts refer to the n1h and
mth polluter." The resulting optimal emissions are depicted in Figure
2 as Pn and PM. Given that the authority can impose only a single tax,
E

Figure 2

which of the optimal taxes should he choose? If the larger tax, T ° ,
is imposed upon both firms, the difference in welfare compared to the
welfare when two taxes are employed is measured by the triangle
ADC in Figure 1. When the smaller tax is chosen, the loss of welfare is measured by the triangle ABC. That tax which results in the
11. For the case of N polluting firms we have

N
i)

Tu

[§(Tn)-(p(T.)]dTn
I
n=I 0
and the conditions for a welfare maximum are

(ii)

W(TI ....

Tn) =

afW(Ti .... T) = f. (T_) -

T(Tn) = 0

Solving for the optimal taxes results in
(il) Tn =(a. - bn )
0anBn

n =1 .... N

n =1 .... N
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in this case ADC, will be best under the assumed
smaller triangle,
12
constraints.
When three or more polluters exist in the community the choice
among the optimal taxes is more complex. It is incorrect to apply the
previous analysis and simply choose the largest tax. The reasons for
this can be illustrated by investigating the three polluter case as depicted in Figure 3. By arguments similar to those in the previous
paragraph it can be shown that Tn is better than T O, but it cannot be
shown that T.° is always preferred to TO. The geometrical reason for
this is that the choice depends upon the relative size of the triangle
ABC and the ellipsoid EDFG, the relative size of which will depend
upon the differences among the damage functions. When the larger
tax is imposed the optimal emission rate from that source which

Figure 3
o
O
12. When T and To. are used the total net benefit is EGA + FGC. If T is imposed
the
nth
firm
but a net
obtained
from
upon both firms then the net benefit EGA is still
benefit (which may now be negative) of (FGC - ADC) is obtained from the mth
firm. The amount ACD is the excess of abatement costs over benefits for removing the
- PO). The difference in welfare between using two taxes and one tax is
pollution (PRD
°
obviously ADC. When only T 2 is used the net benefit is FGC + EGA - ABC, where
h
ABC is the excess of benefits over cost that could be obtained in the nt firm if abatement was increased for that firm.
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causes the most damage is obtained, but such a tax reduces beyond
the optimal rate the emissions of more than one firm, thus requiring
that they expend more resources upon abatement than the resulting

benefits warrant. The greater the number of less harmful polluters
there are the more likely it will be that the larger tax will not be the
constrained optimal one.
If the pollution authority is constrained to use one tax there is no
a priori reason why he should choose from only among the optimal
taxes for each source. The best single tax is not among the single optimal ones, but rather a weighted average of the optimal taxes, the
weights being the ratios of the differences in the coefficients of the
damage and benefit function over the sum of such differnces.13 This
conclusion, of course, applies with equal force to other instruments
and, incidentally, at least partially reduces the benefit of doing an in
depth study of one polluting firm in an attempt to establish abatement guidelines for all other firms.
Though these results apply only to the case of linear functions,
the principles involved are the same whether we assume linearity or
non-linearity, and they may serve as approximations to more complex functional forms. An alternative assumption which allows the
same formulas to be used is to assume that the functions are linear
in the logarithms of the variables. For such functions (a) and (b)
would be interpreted as elasticities, and the formulas remain unchanged.
If the political constraints imposed upon the APCD are not as
severe as I have supposed, an abatement program using several tax
rates could in principle be implemented. If k taxes could be employed,
that is to say that k classifications of polluters are established, then
13. The relevant welfare function for this case is
N T
(i)

W(T) =

Y
n=1

J

[§.(T)

-

q ,(T)]dT

0

h
where fn(T) and q).(T) are the MD and MCS functions relevant to the nt polluting
firm.
The condition for a welfare maximum is
N
Y. [§n(T) - (pn(T)] = 0.
WT
(i) i W(T)

n=1
Solving (ii) for T and assuming, as in Figures 2 and 3 that b.= bm for all n, m, we
obtain
T (an- b)
4
_
_Ya n __bn
(iii)

-o

Tn i=1a7
N
n=1(a.n=1

=
_

b.)

N
[
(an n=1

_
_n

n=1n

b,)]

_
n1

N
[
(an n=1

b.)]
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the analysis would proceed much as before to obtain k tax formulas
each being some weighted average of the optimal taxes applicable to
those polluters within the particular category. Decisions on how to
define the classification of polluters would take into account such
characteristics as rate of unregulated emission, type of pollutant, location, and marginal abatement costs. Based upon such characteristics, a system of multiple taxes will obtain a higher welfare gain than
the single tax. An intuitive reason for the validity of this statement
is immediate when it is realized that as the number of taxes approaches the number of polluters, those conditions for a welfare
maximum are obtained.
V
The most common form of the effluent standard form of abatement that has received attention in the pollution literature is that
which is referred to as "equi-proportionate abatement." What is
usually meant by such a control method is that all pollution sources
are required to reduce their emissions by a given proportion where
the stated percentage reduction applies to all sources.
To analyze an equi-proportionate abatement program it is convenient to visualize such a program as being implemented through
the imposition of a particular taxing rule and thereby relate it to the
previously derived welfare functions expressed in terms of unit taxes.
For the nth firm a reduction in its emission rate resulting from the
imposition of a unit tax can be expressed as
(11)

AP.= P'- P.

Tb,

where PR'is the maximum emission and Pn, the emission after tax.
From equation (3) it is known that
PM B.
(12)
--- -'
Combining (11 ) and (12)

the expression for the proportional de.AP"
crease in the pollution emission rate, -Pm1 , which we shall denote as
Pn, becomes
(13)
Interpreting B. as the marginal cost of eliminating the last unit of
pollution, the proportional reduction in emissions is equal to the
ratio of the unit tax and this marginal cost.
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It follows directly from the preceding that the equi-proportionate
abatement rule requires that the following condition be implemented.
Tn_Bn
T._ B.m

(14)

That is, continuing to view the equi-proportionate abatement rule as
being implemented through taxation, the ratio of the taxes among
firms must equal the ratio of the marginal costs of eliminating the
last unit of pollution by each firm.
It may appear, from what has been previously established, that
a rule that allows several tax rates to exist would be superior to a
rule allowing only a single tax. This, however, is not the case. The
existence of several tax rates is an illusion, for having chosen T. in
equation (14), Tm is determined since B. and Bm are given constants. Alternatively, the choice of a particular tax rate is identical
to choosing the proportion by which all emissions must be reduced.
Realizing, then, that there is also only one degree of freedom in
this rule, it is not generally the case that this rule is superior to the
optimal single tax rule.
To illustrate these points geometrically, consider the following
three cases. The first and third examples imply that the equi-proportionate rule may be superior to the optimal single tax while the second implies the optimal single tax rule is superior.
In the first example it is assumed that each firm creates the same
damages, has identical marginal costs of abatement, but has different
maximum emission levels. These assumptions imply that (a) the
optimal single tax is a simple average of the separate optimal taxes
and (b) there exists an equi-proportionate rule which exactly obtains
the optimal emission from each firm. Statement (a) follows directly
from the analysis in footnote 13.'" To support statement (b) it need
only be shown that the assumptions imply

(15)

^

Po

P-P
PM

14. The stated conditions imply that

-V

N
YTO (a - b)

.

n=1

Y (a -

n=1

N

N

n=1

N
Y TO

b)

PM

M.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 9

The optimal reduction for the nt h and mth firm can be expressed as
(16)

Pam-

Po_

anBn
bn(a. - b.)

p.

_po=

amBm
bm(am- bm)

and
(17)

for the nh and m"h firms respectively. The optimal proportionate
reduction for the n1h firm is
A0

(18)

P,

anB
bn(an- b)

_

b.

B, -

an

(an-

b.)

which, since an = am and b. = bin, is also the optimal proportionate
reduction for the mth firm.
In the previous example it was unnecessary to designate the relative size of the maximum emissions and, therefore, of the marginal
costs of eliminating the last unit of pollution. For the second case
it is necessary, however, and it is assumed that Bm > B.. In the
example now under consideration, all of the assumptions are identical to those in the first example except that it is now assumed
an> am. The relevant curves are displayed in Figure 4 where to
strengthen the expository value of the example, the curves have
been drawn such that the optimal single tax (i.e., the optimal tax
for each firm is the same) is identical to the respective optimal
taxes. This implies that the optimal single tax will reduce emissions
exactly to the optimal rate where the mth firm reduces its emissions
both absolutely and relatively less than the n th firm-precisely the
opposite of that which would occur under the equi-proportionate
rule.
The third example differs from the second in that it assumes
an < am. These conditions are illustrated in Figure 5. The implication from this example is that the m th firm should reduce its pollution by a greater amount than should the nth firm, a result which is
consistent though not identical to an equi-proportionate abatement
program.
The most important advantage of the equi-proportionate abatement rule is that it does not require the APCD to estimate the
value of any tax rate even though the choice of a given proportional
reduction implies a specific tax vector. This advantage is diminished,
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however, in cases such as those depicted in our second example.
The equi-proportionate abatement rule is a special case of effluent
standards which has considerable appeal for its seemingly equitable
treatment of firms though, as has been shown, it is similar in effect
to the imposition of different unit taxes upon firms.
Just as a system employing several taxes is superior to a system
employing only a single tax, so a system employing different equiproportionate reduction rules is superior to one employing a single
reduction rule. It would appear, therefore, that welfare gains could
be obtained if the equi-proportionate rule was implemented by requiring different proportions for different classes of polluters. For
example, it would be better to impose higher proportions on polluters located in densely populated areas and lower proportions on
the same type of polluters in sparsely settled areas than to impose
the same rule on both.
Extending these observations further it can be seen that the three
examples chosen to illustrate certain aspects of the equi-proportionate reduction have simple interpretations. Example one could
represent firms emitting the same pollutants and located in similar
areas, or any other characteristics that would imply similar damage functions, but whose scales of operation are different. The second example implies that the firm emitting the most pollutants
creates the least damage, possibly because of a different pollutant
and/or location, while the third example has the largest polluter
creating the most damage.
These examples do not, of course, exhaust all of the possible combinations and they suffer from over simplification by assuming similar
marginal costs of abatement, but they represent the type of gross
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empirical work that could be used to supply information used in the
drafting of pollution ordinances. If within a given community the
assumptions underlying example one and three are a reasonable description of the polluting firms, then the equi-proportionate rule has
definite advantages. If the second example is more accurate then the
equi-proportionate rule is not advantageous on this account and alternatives must be sought.
VI

I now consider my previous statement that implementing an efficient input standard requires that the APCD obtain more information than do the use of unit taxes or effluent standards. The latter
two programs require that the optimal emission be known, but the
input standard requires in addition that the APCD know the optimum allocation of those factors used by the firm in reducing its
pollution.
Suppose that the APCD has informed a particular firm that it
must reduce its emission by a stated amount, say (P m - Po). (A
directive already containing as much information as unit taxes or
effluent standards !) In general the firm may employ several factors
in its abatement program; however, for simplicity I shall assume
that only two are available: electrical precipitators (E) and water
scrubbers (S). The firm then engages in "producing" pollution
abatement and is guided by the same principles as in the production
of any other good.
One of the conditions the cost minimizing firm must satisfy, and
one incidentally that is a condition for being on the MCS function,
is that the ratio of the unit costs of each factor be equal to the ratio
of the marginal products of each factor in reducing pollution of
producing abatement services. When this condition is satisfied for
the given reduction in pollution (P- - Po) there will be an optimal
combination of E and S, say (EO, SO). Any other combination will
be non-optimal and entail costs of abatement greater than the
minimum cost combination.'"
From this it is easy to see that the APCD is required to know
not only what the optimum reduction in pollution is, but also the
15. The firm's activities can be illustrated in the following manner: the firm seeks
to minimize the cost function:
(i)
C = WS + w2 E
subject to the constraint
(ii)
(Pm - Po) = AP =P(S,E),
where P(S,E) is the "production function" for pollution abatement. This requires that
it find the critical values for the Lagrangean expression
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optimal combination of E and S. This in turn requires that the
APCD know the "abatement production functions" confronting
each firm.16 Such a requirement would be impossible to satisfy.
(wIS + w 2E) + X(/LP -P(S,E))

=

(iii)
which are

a. w i -

APB =

b. w 2

XP, = 0

0

(iv)
-

where the wj's are the factor prices, X the Lagrangean multiplier, and P and P" the
marginal products of S and E respectively. Equations (iv) imply the condition

(v)

w2

P.

W2

P,

To investigate the consequences of constraining the firm to use El of the one factor we
form the Lagrangean expression
(vi)

k

=

(wjE +

w2S)

+

X(AP

-

P 1 (S)

-

P 2 (E))

+ V(E -

1

E )

were without loss of generality we have assumed that the prodluction function is
separable. This will prove useful in the exposition to follow.
Differentiating (vi) with respect to S and E, we obtain the conditions
a. w 1

-

XP

0

NP,-

P

(vii)
b. w2

-

0

which can be expressed as
=

(viii)

P,

We denote the combination of factors which satisfy (v) as (SO,EO) and that which
satisfies (viii) as (S1,E1). With unchanged factor prices we must satisfy the condition
Po
P
(ix)

po -

E

p1

X

E

which, if the additional constraint is binding, that is, if V j4 0 which in turn implies
S1 > SO, implies that PO , P1 and PO =7-4P1 where the zero superscript refers to the
marginal products from (v) and the unity superscript refers to the marginal products
from (viii). Assuming a separable production function implies that the marginal products of a factor is a function only of that factor. Consequently, since . >0 and because
Pl< P' from the assumption that E 1>E 0 and diminishing returns to each factor, it
must be the case that less S be used thus making PA > Pg and thereby acquiring the
needed equality in (ix).
16. One case in which the establishing of input standards may not result in higher
abatement costs is the case where, although several methods of pollution are available,
the production function for pollution abatement is linear. Such a function implies linear
isoquants and, consequently, the optimal combination of the factors for a given reduction is either all of one factor or an indeterminant combination. The indeterminate
solution occurs when the price ratio for the inputs is equal to the ratio of the marginal
products in the production function. The corner solution, the use of only one factor,
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Vii

It has been established that input standards imposed incorrectly
decrease the gains in welfare compared to a correct input standard
for under such circumstances the firm is not permitted to operate
at its minimum cost position. This point is illustrated in Figure 1
by incorporating the excess costs into the MCS function and denoting it as MCS*. for a reduction in the emission rate of (Pmo - Po)
the welfare gain is now (FP.H - EGH) which is less than the

previous gain for such a reduction FPmIH. I shall denote the difference between these two measures as AW for a given reduction
in the emission rate and refer to it as the welfare loss from incorrect
factor combinations. The AW loss exists in addition to those losses
associated with imposing an instrument at the wrong magnitude for
it is the additional costs of obtaining any reduction in pollution
other than at minimum cost.
Each of the preceding control instruments requires that the
APCD have the ability to detect whether polluting firms comply
with the ordinance. The imposition of taxes, payments, or effluent
standards requires that emission rates be measurable which implies
that monitoring devices be installed at the source of pollution. Input
standards do not require such monitoring devices for in principle
the desired emission rate is obtained by the input standard imposed.
Rather it is required that the APCD have some administrative
machinery designed to check the firm's compliance with the standard. These regulatory practices use resources and have their costs
and should, therefore, be included in the analysis of the welfare
gains from pollution abatement.
Regulation costs may also be illustrated as a displacement of the
original MCS function such that the MCS* may now be interpreted
as the marginal cost of abatement which includes administrative
costs. When these additional costs are taken into account, the optimal emission rate will be larger than in their absence and will be,
for the example in Figure 1, Po. In a state of perfect knowledge
and absence of constraints other than those inherent to the problem,
the APCD should choose that abatement instrument that has the
lowest administrative cost of regulation.
The use of imput standards has costs of regulation in addition to
the additional costs associated with incorrect factor combinations
occurs when these ratios differ, in which case that factor will be used having the lowest
price. It follows that, if the input standard regulation requires the polluter to use that
factor whose unit price is the lowest, the resulting level of abatement is obtained at
minimum cost. If such is not the case the minimum cost condition is not satisfied and
inefficiency is introduced.
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though this in no way implies that input standards are the most
costly. Because emission rates are difficult, if not impossible, to
measure in a manner required by the analysis in this article and the
prospects for improvement in this area are not encouraging and
certainly not inexpensive, the analysis in this paper would appear to
favor input standards. To my knowledge there is little information
on the cost aspects of input standards, though some exists on the
relative efficiency of different abatement factors. It appears reasonable to suppose that through laboratory type experiments the
effectiveness of certain abatement equipment could be established,
and on the basis of such information certain equipment could be
required at levels commensurate with the APCD's notions of how
much the emission rate should be decreased. Listing alternative
abatement requirements would circumvent some of the information
problems associated with distortions of costs by allowing each firm
to choose a particular method most appropriate to its production
processes.
VIII

The type of analysis I have conducted in the preceding sections
can be carried a good deal further; but I think enough has been
said to justify the following:
1. The optimal control of pollution requires much more information than currently exists or will exist in the foreseeable future.
2. Second best solutions must be employed. Since many such
programs exist, a considerable amount of research at the local level
will be required to determine which program is the most appropriate
for the given community.
3. Given any choice of the method of abatement, multiple control instruments are superior to single instruments.
4. Abatement programs preferred on grounds of efficiency in
that they allow the firm the most freedom in choosing its abatement method, may not be preferred when administrative costs are
included in the analysis.
5. Since taxes and equi-proportionate reduction rules allow the
firm to reduce pollution in the most efficient manner, methods of
checking compliance should be devised to take advantage of the
gains such programs make in efficient abatement.
6. In the face of severe budget and data constraints considerable gains in welfare may be forthcoming by choosing the abatement program on the basis of rough calculations concerning the
characteristics of the communities' pollution problem.

